International Journal of Mechanical Engineering and Technology (IJMET)
Volume 9, Issue 3, March 2018, pp. 987–990, Article ID: IJMET_09_03_101
Available online at http://www.iaeme.com/IJMET/issues.asp?JType=IJMET&VType=9&IType=3
ISSN Print: 0976-6340 and ISSN Online: 0976-6359

SECURING IOT NETWORKS USING AN ONION ROUTING BASED APPROACH

P S Ajay Mishael and Joy Paulose
Christ University, India

ABSTRACT

Internet of Things (IoT) comprises of small, connected, power-efficient devices with minimal to average computing power. The devices are autonomous, cyber-physical objects capable of sensing, processing, storing and networking. Due to their connected nature, they are exposed to a huge number of threats and vulnerabilities. A new gateway to ensure anonymity in IoT networks using The Onion Router (TOR) hidden services in a Single-Board Computer (SBC) is proposed in this paper.

Key words: IoT, TOR, Anonymity, Hidden Services, Privacy, Security, Onion Routing.

Cite this Article: P S Ajay Mishael and Joy Paulose, Securing IOT Networks Using an Onion Routing Based Approach, *International Journal of Mechanical Engineering and Technology* 9(3), 2018, pp. 987–990.
http://www.iaeme.com/IJMET/issues.asp?JType=IJMET&VType=9&IType=3

1. INTRODUCTION

Internet of Things (IoT) devices generate, process and send vast amounts of sensitive and critical information. Since IoT devices usually require a connection to the World Wide Web, they are susceptible to a large number of malicious attacks. A few important malicious attacks are presented in Table 1 as given below.

Table I Common Attacks in IoT networks

No	Attacks against IoT	
	THREAT	**DESCRIPTION**
1	Man-In-The-Middle Attack (MITM) [1]	An attacker pretends to be a legitimate entity of the network
2	ThingBot [2]	The embedded devices are taken over and controlled by an adversary without the user's knowledge
3	Information theft [2]	The adversary taps the sensitive information on the network and uses it for malicious intents.
4	Key Reinstalllation Attack (KRACK) [3]	It involves packet theft by exploiting the key reinstallation feature of the WiFi Protected Access (WPA) protocol.
5	Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) [4]	Multiple devices are taken over by the attacker with the intention of launching a larger attack against a particular server.

The distributed and autonomous nature of embedded devices in an IoT network make them appealing targets for adversaries[5]. All Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) make use of the IEEE 802.15.5 protocol which offers basic authentication and security [2]. The IoT threat model changed dramatically after WSNs gained the ability to access the public internet as attackers can reach WSNs ubiquitously where sensor nodes are the most vulnerable due to scarce computational resources [2]. In order to ensure large-scale acceptance of IoT networks; security, including confidentiality, integrity, availability and privacy issues must be addressed in order to make them trustworthy to the public [6].

The problem of addressing security issues in IoT networks is the need to make changes to the physical architecture of the IoT device and the network, to allocate computational resources for complex security mechanisms. Altering the hardware and software design in existing systems is an expensive and time-consuming task.

The Onion Router (TOR) is an overlay network which provides anonymity to its users by making use of onion routing [7]. Onion routing is a concept that makes use of multiple layers of encryption, meaning every node to node connection is encrypted using a unique key [8]. TOR is an open source software and is supported entirely by volunteer-run relays. TOR provides maximum anonymity due to the presence of diverse nodes and clients.

TOR also allows setting up of rendezvous hidden points which allow setting up of hidden servers [7]. The hidden service can be accessed only through an onion address which is unique and private for each website on the dark web [7]. In this research paper, a new approach to secure IoT networks by making use of TOR hidden services and Raspberry Pi 3 model B as the secure gateway for the IoT networks is proposed and implemented in a small-scale experiment. The Raspberry Pi is used as the Single-Board Computer (SBC) due to its low cost, easy availability and wide compatibility [9].

The Raspberry Pi is set up to run a TOR hidden server. It is also set up to run an IoT firmware which interfaces with the IoT devices and secures all outgoing connections by sending them through the TOR network.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

A lot of research has been done to provide anonymity, authentication and security in IoT networks. There is only one level of security provided by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. It provides basic access control, message integrity, message confidentiality and replay protection[7]. IoT is a resource-constrained environment with a low CPU, memory, and bandwidth budget. These characteristics directly impact the threats to the design of security protocols [10]. Present day IoT systems are not sufficiently enhanced to fulfill the desired functional requirements and bear security and privacy risks, they are vulnerable to a wide array of attacks [6].

Mohammed Abdur Razzaqueet, et al. conducted a survey on middleware for IoT systems and found that reliability, security and privacy are still unexplored areas in the domain of IoT[11]. Anonymity over public networks is an absolute necessity due to the ever-increasing number of threats and attacks. Onion routing is an infrastructure that provides strong resistance against threats like eavesdropping and traffic analysis[12]. Onion routing can be easily implemented in any network without major modifications to the infrastructure of the network entities.

Many Anonymity protocols have been proposed and implemented: TOR, PipeNet, Crowds, Tarzan, Morphmix, MixMinion and Loopix [7] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]. As of

today, TOR is the most widely used anonymity service with over 37,600 volunteer run relays and a cumulative relay bandwidth of over 200 Gigabits per second [19].

Nguyen Phong Hoang, et al, [20] tested the TOR network with smart home appliances and found that an anonymous routing protocol embedded within the router is the most feasible and reliable solution to provide privacy and security for IoT networks.

TOR provides a hidden server service which allows its users to conceal the location and presence of their server on the public internet [7]. Hidden servers are immune to many of the prevalent attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) Attacks, Website Fingerprinting and Traffic Analysis. Anonymizing the network entities can be used as a countermeasure to prevent unethical actions which exploit traces of data left in the network.

TOR employs a layered encryption approach with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption techniques to secure packets sent from the client/server. Only the originator of the packet knows about its final destination and content. TOR encrypts the data as well as the next node destination IP address multiple times and sends it through a circuit which consists of randomly selected volunteer-relays.

To solve the security issues of existing IoT networks either the entire protocol and architecture design of each IoT component has to be modified or a new middleware which implements an anonymous, secure and reliable security protocol has to be used. Raspberry Pi 3 model B is an SBC with sufficient computing power and memory to run any version of a Linux based operating system. Detailed analysis of the Raspberry Pi has shown that as an ultra-cheap-yet-serviceable computer board, with support for a large number of input and output peripherals and network communication, is the perfect platform for interfacing with many different devices and usage in a wide range of applications[21]. SBCs are capable of connecting to networks and interfacing with different types of IoT devices. Setting up an SBC as the gateway for an IoT network ensures maximum compatibility and makes adding new devices to the IoT network an easy task.

After analyzing the existing security mechanism for IoT network the need for a secure gateway which offers anonymity, reliability, security, confidentiality and scalability is observed [10]. Most IoT devices cannot implement complex security protocols such as onion routing due to the limited availability of computational resources.

3. EXISTING SYSTEM

Consider the example of a home automation system which has two gateways with multiple IoT devices connected to each gateway as shown in Figure 1. The gateway has a considerable amount of processing power and is responsible for critical functions such as connectivity, security and embedded device management. The gateway makes use of lightweight encryption techniques such as Elliptical Curve Cryptography (ECC) to secure the data sent through it [22].

The problem with the existing system is that all the packets are sent openly on the internet. An adversary with malicious intent and sufficient computational resources can easily perform an attack to extract and manipulate the packets being sent/received. A Key Reinstallation Attack (KRACK) can compromise all packets in a wireless network without breaking the encrypted authentication key [3]. An IoT network connected and controlled through the public internet is exposed to a huge number of malicious users.



Figure 1 A generic representation of existing IoT systems

Another existing approach to control IoT networks makes use of a Cloud service provider to transfer and receive all packets as shown in Figure 2. The packets from the gateway are secured using Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS), which makes use of a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate to ensure the authenticity of the sender/receiver. The cloud approach provides more security but fails in terms of privacy. Government laws as of today state that the cloud service provider must co-operate with the government authorities in providing data when and as necessary. This means that sensitive, confidential and critical information is not safe from government authorities if stored in the cloud. There are many existing gateways such as Ubi, Wink Hub, Smart things hub and MyQ garage but none of them provide anonymity and privacy [23].



Figure 2 An IoT network using cloud services

4. PROPOSED SYSTEM

The method proposed in this research is to use an SBC as the gateway after hiding it within the dark web. The hidden gateway can be accessed only by those in possession of the.onion Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and a 22-bit authentication cookie. The only way to access the gateway is by requesting the .onion URL through an Onion Routing client [24]. All parameters that can be used to identify the gateway is completely hidden.

The hidden server works as follows [7]:

Assumptions made:

- The client has a TOR enabled browser running on his/her device.
- The client has knowledge of the .onion URL.
- The client has the authentication cookie to access the hidden server.
- The IoT devices are interfaced with the hidden server in a secure way.
- The hidden server is accessible only through its introduction points.

The sequence of communication:

- The client first chooses a rendezvous point and builds a three-hop circuit to it.
- The client then creates an *introduce* message which contains details about the rendezvous point and is encrypted using the hidden server's public key. This introduce message is delivered via one of the hidden server's randomly assigned introduction points.
- The hidden server uses the details contained in the *introduce* message to establish a circuit to the rendezvous point.
- The rendezvous point notifies the client about successful connection establishment and the circuits are used for normal communication between the hidden server and the client.
- The entire path between the client and the hidden server consists of a total of six random relays.

In the proposed system, the SBC which is used as the gateway runs the onion routing hidden service and the IoT firmware. It interfaces with various IoT devices and acts as the middleware. It is responsible for collecting, updating and analyzing the data provided by the smart objects present in the network [11].



Figure 3 Proposed System Architecture

In Figure 3, the IoT controller device runs an onion routing client, the onion routing client fetches a consensus of the anonymity network from the directory server and uses the fetched data to build a circuit consisting of three randomly chosen relays [7]. The gateway exists in the dark web and does not appear in any Domain Name Server (DNS) lookup making it impossible to access the gateway without sufficient credentials. The SBC gateway runs a TOR hidden server and provides the firmware as a hidden service to the controller device. This hidden service cannot be found by anyone unless and until it is advertised by the host.

The only way to access the hidden service is via an onion routing browser along with legitimate credentials.

Table II Comparison of proposed and existing systems.

NO	Parameters for Anonymity	A	B	C	D	E
1	Sufficient Authentication	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
2	Secure Network Services	N	N	N	N	Y
3	Cryptography	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
4	Secure Mobile Interface	N	N	N	N	Y
5	Secure Firmware	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	Secure Web Interface	N	N	Y	N	Y
7	Sensitive data security	Y	N	Y	N	Y
8	Transport Layer Security (TLS) Validation	N	N	N	N	Y
9	MITM Attack Protection	N	N	N	N	Y
10	Replay Attack protection	Y	N	Y	N	Y

Table II Abbreviations:

A: Wink Hub; B: Ubi; C: SmartThings Hub; D: MyQ Garage, E: Proposed System using SBC and TOR anonymity network. Y: YES; N: NO.

Table II shows a comparison of the security features in various existing gateways. The proposed system is free from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, Man-In-The-Middle Attacks (MITM), Traffic analysis, Website fingerprinting, User impersonation attacks and KRACK attacks since all packets pass through the TOR network, hence making it impossible for an adversary to find and intercept them.

The sequence of events in the proposed system from the client's perspective are:

- The data to be sent is segmented into packets of the same size and format by the onion proxy. Uniformity is important to make sure that a possible attacker is not able to identify users on the basis of packet size. TOR uses a packet size of 512 bytes as shown in Figure 4.
- The Onion Proxy then builds a three-hop circuit based on a weighted random function which uses bandwidth, delay, geo-location and reliability as parameters for choosing the relays for circuit formation.



Figure 4 TOR cell format.

- After circuit formation, the packet to be sent is encrypted with three different keys which are exchanged securely between the client and the chosen nodes. The onion proxy makes use of Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm [5].
- The final packet is encrypted with K3, K2, and K1 in the exact mentioned order. K3,K2 and K1 are the negotiated keys for the exit node, middle node and the entry node, respectively. A packet g looks as follows after the encryption.

$$(K1(K2(K3(g))))$$

The first layer of encryption is decrypted at the entry node of the circuit. The second layer of encryption is peeled off at the middle node and the third layer is removed at the exit node.

- At the Receiver end, in this case, the rendezvous point, a packet with normal HTTPS standard encryption is received. The rendezvous point encrypts the packet with three layers of encryption again to send it to the hidden server. This ensures anonymity at both the ends. Any relay within the circuit knows only the next and the previous relay.
- A normal packet goes through six relays and is encrypted twice with three layers of encryption at the client/hidden server and the rendezvous point.

All the solutions for IoT security focus on lightweight techniques for the resource-constrained IoT network. The proposed system makes use of a separate gateway capable of Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption which is the highest standard of encryption available currently [25].

The client's data passes through six different relays and one layer of encryption is removed at each consecutive relay. The intended sent data is received by the gateway but the client and the gateway remain completely anonymous due to the usage of a rendezvous point as the exchange point for all packets.

5. IMPLEMENTATION

The proposed architecture is implemented by making use of the following hardware and software components:

Figure 5 Experiment setup with the Arduino and I/O devices.

Hardware Components

- Raspberry Pi 3 model B (As the Gateway): Raspberry Pi 3 model B offers 1Gb of RAM, Quad Core 1.2GHz Broadcom BCM2837 64-bit CPU, 40-pin extended GPIO, 4 USB 2.0 ports, Full-size HDMI, CSI camera port, DSI display port, Micro SD port, 2.5 A power source.

- Laptop or any mobile device: TOR requires very minimal resources in order to run smoothly and can easily be installed on an SBC. The laptop must have a minimum of 2GB RAM and an Intel Pentium processor or greater.
- Arduino Uno: Arduino Uno is a single-board micro-controller which supports only serial communication. The Arduino is connected to the Raspberry Pi using a USB A 2.0 cable.
- I/O devices for Raspberry Pi: A 5-inch display, standard keyboard, and an optical mouse are used for interacting with the Raspberry Pi.

Software Components

- Home Assistant: Home Assistant is a home automation platform running on python 3. It is capable of tracking and controlling all home appliances. Home assistant is chosen as the firmware for the SBC mainly due to its open-source nature and customizability.
- TOR Hidden Services: TOR is available for all Linux based operating systems. TOR can be downloaded as a service or as a browser bundle. TOR is chosen as the anonymity service due its wide availability and compatibility across different platforms.
- Raspbian Jessie 4.9: Raspbian is the official operating system of Raspberry Pi. Raspbian is chosen as the operating system for this experiment due to a large amount of updates and support available.
- Wireshark: Wireshark is a packet sniffing tool which helps to monitor networks and allows Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and network monitoring. Wireshark is used to check if the gateway leaves any trace on the network it is run on.

The experiment is set up as follows:

- Raspbian operating system is installed on the Raspberry Pi 3 model B.
- All dependencies required for home assistant are installed.
- TOR is downloaded and necessary changes are made to the torrc file to set up the hidden service.
- After setting up the host, modifications are made to the torrc file on Orbot (for mobile devices) and TOR browser bundle (for desktops).
- The authentication cookie and .onion URL are extracted from the host and used in the configuration files of the client's browser to enable access to the TOR network.
- After restarting the TOR services, the home-assistant web interface is accessible through a TOR enabled client device.

Figure 6 shows a screenshot of the authentication cookie of the hidden server. This is obtained on a terminal in the raspbian operating system after modifying and installing TOR. Multiple fields in the TOR configuration file (torrc) are modified to make TOR compatible with devices that support only ARM architecture (Raspberry Pi).



Figure 6 The onion address and 22-bit authentication cookie.

On requesting the .onion URL in a TOR-enabled browser, after adding the authentication cookie, the home-assistant homepage opens on the TOR browser. Any attacker trying to find the location of the hidden server has to break three levels of TLS encryption which is known to be one of the strongest encryption standard available [25]. The gateway can be accessed on a mobile device by making use of Orbot which is a mobile application available for Android and iOS (iPhone Operating System) devices. Orbot provides its users with an option of adding hidden service cookies within the application settings.

Without using the authentication cookie, the gateway cannot be accessed through Orbot. On requesting the .onion webpage without the authentication cookie, the TOR proxy shows an error page as shown in Figure 8. The owner of the gateway can create and revoke as many authentication cookies as required. This allows for a secure access control system. Figure 9 shows a screenshot of the gateway's homepage being accessed after entering the authentication cookie.



Figure 8 Accessing the gateway without Authentication cookie



Figure 9 Accessing the gateway with Authentication cookie

6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To access the proposed gateway system, the user needs to have the following credentials:

- The hidden service's .onion URL.
- The hidden server's 22-bit authentication cookie.
- The gateway firmware's user ID and password.
- A configured TOR client.

An adversary looking for targets is unable to find the gateway as it does not exist on the public internet. Even if the adversary does find the gateway, he/she has to break two more lines of security (Authentication cookie and firmware credentials) to access the data. A breach in the proposed gateway is highly improbable and in case of a breach, the administrator can easily secure the gateway by revoking all the authentication cookies.

A sample blink program is uploaded to the Arduino to test the delay involved in the client-gateway communication. The gateway responded to the request a little slower than a normal gateway. There is a significant delay only during the process of circuit formation. The communication between the hidden gateway and the client is smooth and uninterrupted after formation of the circuit.

Table III shows a comparison of response times in multiple gateways. This response time is obtained by using the ping command along with the IP address of the gateway. The proposed gateway takes an average of 1.5 seconds for circuit formation. Circuit formation time varies continuously based on the total throughput of the TOR network. The response time of existing gateways is taken from Veracode's white paper on IoT gateways [23].

Table III Comparison of response times

GATEWAY	RESPONSE TIME
Wink	150 milliseconds
Ubi	132 milliseconds
SmartThings Hub	120 milliseconds
Proposed Gateway	250 milliseconds after circuit formation.

There is always a trade off between security and network speed. Complex security mechanisms such as the one employed by TOR reduces the access speed due to the overhead cost involved. To achieve high levels of anonymity and security a small overhead is involved which is very minimal when compared to the damage that can be caused by attackers who are capable of exploiting the vulnerabilities of an otherwise exposed gateway. The torrc file is the official TOR configuration file and can be modified by the user. Figure 7 shows a modification of the torrc file for the home assistant experiment. The client has to input the .onion URL along with the 22-bit authentication cookie in the torrc file.



Figure 7 Torrc file on a windows TOR client

The gateway's traffic is captured using Wireshark as shown in Figure 10. WireShark is a network analysis tool used by network security professionals to capture and analyze packets in a network. After two hours of traffic analysis on the gateway, no trace of the gateway's IP address is found in the log file created by Wireshark. The gateways original IP address is 192.162.1.116 which does not appear on WireShark's capture list. This proves that the proposed gateway provides another line of defense against router exploits, DDoS attacks, MITM attacks and traffic analysis.



Figure 10 Wireshark shows no trace of the gateway.

All prevalent attacks on IoT networks are possible only because of easy access to the IP address of the IoT gateway [4]. The attacker may use a packet sniffer WSN along with Wireshark to analyze all packets within a target network. Anonymity is very important to prevent such attacks. TOR also provides an option to spoof the Media Access Control (MAC) address. On spoofing the MAC address, the IoT gateway's Network Interface Card (NIC) cannot be traced or identified on any network.

7. CONCLUSIONS

The entire design of the existing system need not be changed in order to accommodate reliable and resource-consuming security protocols. By making use of a powerful SBC such as the Raspberry Pi 3 and an anonymity service such as the TOR hidden services it is possible to secure any type of IoT network and provide multiple lines of defense against attackers. Even though the TOR network is slow, statistics-based predictions from TOR metrics indicate that the number of TOR relays will increase due to the upcoming implementation of an incentive-based anonymity network which in turn will increase the total available bandwidth. Hidden servers can easily be set up using SBCs to secure large-scale IoT networks. The scope of anonymity based IoT security is still an unexplored area.

REFERENCES

[1] Z. Cekerevac, Z. Dvorak, L. Prigoda, and P. Cekerevac, "Internet of things and the man-in-the-middle attacks - Security and economic risks," *MEST J.*, 2017.

[2] D. M. Mendez, I. Papapanagiotou, and B. Yang, "Internet of Things: Survey on Security and Privacy," pp. 1–16, 2017.

[3] M. Vanhoef, F. Piessens, and K. U. Leuven, "Key Reinstallation Attacks : Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2," 2017.

[4] S. Nath and S. Som, "Security and Privacy Challenges: Internet of Things," *Indian J. Sci. Technol.*, vol. 10, no. 3, 2017.

[5] C. M. Medaglia and A. Serbanati, "The Internet of Things," pp. 389–395, 2010.

[6] D. Uckelmann, M. Harrison, and F. Michahelles, "Architecting the Internet of Things," pp. 1–25, 2011.

[7] R. Dingledine, M. Nick, and P. Syverson, "Tor : The Second-Generation Onion Router," *13th USENIX Secur. Symp.*, 2004.

[8] M. Reed, P. F. Syverson, and D. Goldschlag, "Anonymous connection and onion routing," *1997 IEEE Symp. Secur. Priv.*, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 482, 494, 1998.

[9] M. Maksimović, V. Vujović, N. Davidović, V. Milošević, and B. Perišić, "Raspberry Pi as Internet of Things hardware : Performances and Constraints," *Des. Issues*, vol. 3, no. JUNE, p. 8, 2014.

[10] T. Borgohain, U. Kumar, and S. Sanyal, "Survey of Security and Privacy Issues of Internet of Things," *arXiv Prepr. arXiv1501.02211*, p. 7, 2015.

[11] S. A. Chelloug and M. A. El-Zawawy, "Middleware for Internet of Things: Survey and Challenges," *Intell. Autom. Soft Comput.*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1–9, 2017.

[12] D. Chasaki and C. Mansour, "Security challenges in the internet of things," *Int. J. Space-Based Situated Comput.*, vol. 5, no. 3, p. 141, 2015.

[13] W. Dai, "PipeNet 1.1." Nov-1998.

[14] M. K. M. Reiter and A. D. A. Rubin, "Crowds: Anonymity for web transactions," *ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. ...*, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 66–92, 1998.

[15] M. J. Freedman and R. Morris, "Tarzan : A Peer-to-Peer Anonymizing Network Layer," *Technology*, no. 2001, pp. 193–206, 2002.

[16] M. Rennhard and B. Plattner, "Introducing MorphMix: peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage with collusion detection," *Proc. 2002 ACM Work. Priv. Electron. Soc.*, pp. 91–102, 2002.

[17] G. Danezis, R. Dingledine, and N. Mathewson, "Mixminion: Design of a type III anonymous remailer protocol," *Proc. - IEEE Symp. Secur. Priv.*, vol. 2003–Janua, pp. 2–15, 2003.

[18] A. M. Piotrowska *et al.*, "The Loopix Anonymity System This paper is included in the Proceedings of the The Loopix Anonymity System," *USENIX Secur.*, 2017.

[19] "TOR metrics." [Online]. Available: www.tormetrics.org. [Accessed: 03-Nov-2017].

[20] N. P. Hoang, D. Pishva, and R. Asia, "A TOR-Based Anonymous Communication Approach to Secure Smart Home Appliances," vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 517–525, 2014.

[21] M. Cerm and P. Celeda, "Network-based HTTPS Client Identification Using SSL / TLS Fingerprinting."

[22] P. Shruti and R. Chandraleka, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Security In The Context Of Internet Of Things," vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 90–93, 2017.

[23] Veracode, "The Internet of Things: Security Research Study," 2014.

[24] B. Hawkins, "InfoSec Reading Room Under The Ocean of the Internet - The Deep Web," p. 22, 2016.

[25] L. C. Paulson, "Inductive Analysis of the Internet Protocol TLS," vol. 1, no. 212.

[26] C. Malathi and M.Nithyavelam, IoT Based Access and Analysis of Wireless Sensor Node Protocols with Low Power Host Connectivity, International Journal of Civil Engineering and Technology, 8(12), 2017, pp. 77–88

[27] Snehal R. Shinde, A. H. Karode and Dr. S. R. Suralkar, Review on- IOT Based Environment Monitoring System, International Journal of Electronics and Communication Engineering and Technology , 8(2), 2017, pp. 103–108.

[28] Ashlesha A. Patil and Dr. S. R. Suralkar. Review on -IOT Based Smart Healthcare System. International Journal of Advanced Research in Engineering and Technology, 8(3), 2017, pp 37–42.